Systematic Recurrent Chylopericardium How to Manage This Rare Thing

Nonetheless, the mechanisms driving this desire differ between traits Whereas the perceived social desirability of individuals' trait levels accounted for change goals on most HEXACO dimensions, it did not account for change goals on Honesty-Humility and Openness to Experience. By implication, a desire to have socially desirable characteristics that one lacks can explain change goals for some traits, but not for those traits underlying individual differences in values. As an aside, the studies offer vital information on personality development of the HEXACO dimensions over time, spanning 10 and 3.5 years, respectively. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).Six experiments examined responses to groups whose attitudes deviated from wider social norms about asylum and immigration (in the United Kingdom), or about taxation levels (in the U.S.). Subjective group dynamics (SGD) theory states that people derogate in-group individuals who deviate from prescriptive in-group norms. This enables members to sustain the subjective validity of those norms and, hence, a positive social identity. Research also shows that in-group deviants who accentuate the difference between the in-group and out-group norm (e.g., extremists) are derogated less than deviants who attenuate that difference (e.g., a member who veers toward the outgroup's norm; Abrams et al., 2000). We hypothesize that these effects and the associated group dynamics should scale up when people evaluate deviant groups that are part of larger in-categories. Consistent with SGD theory, participants in Experiments 1, 2, and 3 derogated an in-category attenuating deviant group and upgraded an out-category attenuating deviant group relative to groups that consolidated or accentuated the respective norms of those categories-thereby reinforcing in-category norms relative to out-category norms. Across all experiments, this pattern of differential evaluation was associated with greater subjective validity of the in-category norm. We also hypothesized a novel Deviant Ingroup Protection (DIP) effect, wherein people should curtail derogation of an in-category deviant group when that group is their own. Consistent with this hypothesis, participants in Experiments 4, 5, and 6 evaluated an accentuating in-group, or an attenuating in-group, equally to or more positively than other in-category groups. Implications for political and organizational entrenchment are discussed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).A fundamental feature of sacred values like environmental-protection, patriotism, and diversity is individuals' resistance to trading off these values in exchange for material benefit. Yet, for-profit organizations increasingly associate themselves with sacred values to increase profits and enhance their reputations. In the current research, we investigate a potentially perverse consequence of this tendency that observing values used instrumentally (i.e., in the service of self-interest) subsequently decreases the sacredness of those values. Seven studies (N = 2,785) demonstrate support for this value corruption hypothesis. Deutenzalutamide price Following exposure to the instrumental use of a sacred value, observers held that value as less sacred (Studies 1-6), were less willing to donate to value-relevant causes (Studies 3 and 4), and demonstrated reduced tradeoff resistance (Study 7). We reconcile the current effect with previously documented value protection effects by suggesting that instrumental use decreases value sacredness by shifting descriptive norms regarding value use (Study 3), and by failing to elicit the same level of outrage as taboo tradeoffs, thus inhibiting value protective responses (Studies 4 and 5). These results have important implications People and organizations that use values instrumentally may ultimately undermine the very values from which they intend to benefit. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).Prior knowledge has long been known to shape new episodic memories. However, it is less clear how prior knowledge can scaffold the learning of a new class of information, and how this can bias memory for the episodes that contributed to its acquisition. We aimed to quantify distortions in episodic memories resulting from the use of prior category knowledge to facilitate learning new information. Across 4 experiments, participants encoded and retrieved image-location associations. Most members of a category (e.g., birds) were located near each other, such that participants could leverage their prior category knowledge to learn the spatial locations of categories as they encoded specific image locations. Critically, some typical and atypical category members were in random locations. We decomposed location memory into 2 measures error, a measure of episodic specificity; and bias toward other category members, a measure of the influence of newly-learned information about category locations. First, we found that location memory was more accurate for images whose locations were spatially consistent with their category membership. Second, when images were spatially inconsistent (i.e., in random locations), retrieval of typical category members was more biased toward their category's location relative to atypical ones. These effects replicated across 3 experiments, disappeared when images were not arranged by category, and were stronger than effects observed with images arranged by visual similarity rather than category membership. Our observations provide compelling evidence that memory is a reconstruction of multiple sources of prior knowledge, new learning, and memory for specific events. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).Disgust is an adaptation forged under the selective pressure of pathogens. Yet disgust may cause problems in contemporary societies because of its propensity for "false positives" and resistance to corrective information. Here, we investigate whether disgust, as revealed by oculomotor avoidance, might be reduced through the noncognitive process of habituation. In each of three experiments, we repeatedly exposed participants to the same pair of images, one disgusting and one neutral, and recorded gaze. Experiment 1 (N = 104) found no decline in oculomotor avoidance of the disgusting image after 24 prolonged exposures. Experiment 2 (N = 99) replicated this effect and demonstrated its uniqueness to disgust. In Experiment 3 (N = 93), we provided a gaze-contingent reward to ensure perceptual contact with the disgusting image. Participants looked almost exclusively at the disgusting image for 5 min but resumed baseline levels of oculomotor avoidance once the reward ceased. These findings underscore the challenge of reducing disgust.